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1.   Introduction 
 
Among healthcare reforms in the last decade, medical savings accounts (MSA) 
have been proposed as an alternative sustainable healthcare financing scheme (see 
Goodman and Musgrave 1992).  Indeed, Schieber (1997) and Prescott (1998) have 
labelled MSA as ‘an innovation’ in the design of health financing instruments.  In view of 
the failure of implementing large-scale healthcare reform, Pauly and Goodman (1995a) 
also proposed the use of MSAs in conjunction with high-deductibles health insurance as 
an alternative incremental reform.   
 
The appeal of MSA reform comes from its non-distortionary impacts on 
individuals’ incentives and hence is perceived to be efficient.
1 Instead of employers 
spending on expensive, low-deductible health insurance policy, under MSA plan, 
employers (and employees) would contribute to a medical savings accounts, which is 
usually tax exempted. MSA is often accompanied by a high-deductible catastrophic 
medical insurance, the premiums for which may be paid out from the account.  As such, 
MSA departs from the third-party financing and holds individuals responsible for their 
healthcare consumption funded from their savings.  It thus resolves the over-consumption 
of health services associated with third party financing and leads to efficiency gains from 
the elimination of welfare loss caused by moral hazard. 
 
The growing interests on MSAs hinge on their potential positive impacts to 
contain cost of health spending by making consumers price sensitive and giving 
                                                  
1 Pauly and Goodman (1995a) viewed an efficient health care policy as one that does not distort 
individual’s choice.  It neither encourages nor discourages medical insurance or out-of-pocket medical 
spending relative to the consumption of other goods or savings.     3
consumers an incentive to choose appropriate and cost-effective care.  However, only a 
few countries have experimented with MSAs.  Singapore is the first country to implement 
a nation-wide compulsory medical savings, known as the Medisave in 1984. A decade 
later, in December 1994, China also implemented MSAs for the urban formal sector 
employees nation-wide, after piloting the scheme in the cities of Zhenjian and Jiujang 
(Yip and Hsiao, 1997).   The United States and South Africa have also recently 
experimented with voluntary small scale MSAs.  
 
While some economists support the advantages of MSA, others are more 
sceptical.  For example, Shortt (2002) studied the public systems of China and Singapore 
and conducted simulation analysis based on the United States Medicare data and found 
that MSA by itself has not controlled costs and may increase inequalities in the publicly 
funded systems.  Like Shortt (2002), both Hurley (2002) and Forget et al. (2002) also 
concluded that MSAs are unlikely to advance key Canadian health policy goals with 
respect to cost control.  However, Hanvoravongchai (2002) is of the view that the 
available evidence on the impact of MSAs on health systems is inconclusive, and that 
MSAs are neither a panacea nor a catastrophe for health care systems, and must be 
evaluated in the context of the entire financing scheme.  
 
Most research have focused on the efficiency issues of MSAs in terms of cost 
containment and reducing welfare costs generated by moral hazard. (see also Barr 2001, 
Pauly 2001).
2  However,  this paper concentrates on the very intent of creating the 
                                                  
2 Hsiao (1995) also concluded that Singapore’s MSA itself has contributed less to cost control than the 
supply side instruments.    4
savings account.  One of the key objectives of Medisave is to mobilize resources for 
sustainable healthcare spending over the long term.  A pertinent issue is whether the 
accumulated compulsory medical savings would be adequate to fund healthcare 
expenditures in times of needs.  To address these issues, the Singapore government has 
implemented many regulations regarding the accumulation and utilisation of Medisave.
3 
To help fulfil its role as a pre-funded scheme for medical care, a minimum sum scheme 
was also instituted.  Under this scheme, upon retirement at age 62, members are not 
allowed to withdraw the full amount of savings but must keep a decreed minimum 
amount with the Central Provident Fund Board.
4   
 
In this paper, we examine how much medical savings the Singaporean elderly 
ought to have to adequately finance their medical expenses over the post-retirement 
period.  We begin with a brief review of healthcare financing in Singapore in Section 2.  
In Section 3, we discuss in details the framework used to estimate the present value of 
lifetime healthcare expenses of the elderly.  These involve three subsections, namely: 
calibrating the stream of future healthcare expenditure; stochastic forecasting of cohort 
survival probabilities; and discounting the projected lifetime health care expenses.  The 
projected expenses are calibrated using the survey results of a longitudinal study of 
transition in health and wealth of the elderly Singaporeans.  The survival rates of the 
elderly are obtained mainly through the well-established Lee-Carter demographic 
method; and the yield curves are delineated by the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross stochastic interest 
                                                  
3 The details are given in Section 2.1 of this paper.  
4 The Central Provident Fund (CPF) Board, a statutory board under the Ministry of Manpower in 
Singapore, administers and manages the compulsory savings scheme.  The details are given in Section 2 of 
this paper.  See also Chia and Tsui (2003) for other institutional details regarding the CPF.   5
rate model and two deterministic models.  In Section 4, we present estimates of the 
present value of the healthcare expenses of the elderly under various scenarios.  In 
Section 5, we assess the adequacy of medical savings accounts and draw some policy 
implications.   
 
2.  Healthcare financing in Singapore 
The philosophy of the Singapore’s healthcare financing system is based on 
individual responsibility.  To prevent and curb excessive demand, the Government 
consciously designs policies away from third-party payments and towards cost sharing.  
This philosophy of co-payment is built into the various health-financing schemes, 
underlining the idea that there can be "no free lunch''.
5  Policy formulation is skewed 
towards efficiency and less on equity considerations. Patients have to pay part of the cost 
of medical care and are expected to pay more for higher-level services.   
 
Healthcare financing in Singapore is an integrated system of a compulsory 
savings account (Medisave), a catastrophic medical insurance scheme (Medishield) and a 
means-tested medical expense assistance scheme (Medifund).  These schemes are 
generally referred to as the 3Ms.  In addition, there is a fourth M which is a managed care 
which operates within the private health insurance scheme.
6  I n  w h a t  f o l l o w s ,  w e  
highlight the main features of healthcare financing in Singapore.   
 
                                                  
5 This is in contrast to the WHO’s ideal that prepayment as cornerstone of a fair health system financing.  
The argument being that prepayment affords protection against paying out of pocket, ensures accessibility 
and allows for efficiency gains through risk pooling.  For most countries, the prepayment system operates 
mainly through the social-security system or national health insurance schemes. 
6 This will not be discussed in this paper as the fourth M has not taken off successfully despite the strong 
promotion by the government.    6
2.1  Medical savings accounts (Medisave) 
The concept of mandatory savings is not new for Singapore and its introduction 
was accepted without resistance.  As early as 1955, Singapore had already instituted a 
compulsory savings scheme for old age under the Central Provident Fund (CPF) scheme.  
Medisave is also administered by the CPF Board.  Under the compulsory savings scheme, 
every employee and employer is required to contribute a proportion of the monthly wage 
to the CPF.  The rates vary according to the age of the employees.  The contribution goes 
into the employee's three accounts: Ordinary Account,  Special Account and Medisave 
Account (see Table 1).  These savings while earn interest, are fully tax exempted.   
Savings in the Special account can only be withdrawn upon retirement but savings in 
both the Ordinary and Special Accounts can be withdrawn even before retirement for 
home purchases and other approved investments.  
== Table 1 == 
Contribution rates to the medical savings account follow three tiers, with the rates 
increasing according to age and with a specified maximum contribution per month.
7  
There is a set limit on the total amount accumulated in Medisave.  As of July 2003, this 
limit is set at $30,000.  The imposed limit is to prevent an excessive build-up of 
Medisave balance, which may result in unnecessary use of medical services.  Although 
                                                  
7 All dollars in this paper are in Singapore dollars (US$1 approx. S$1.7).  Currently, the maximum 
contribution per month is set at $360 for those aged 35 and below; $420 for those between age 35 and 45 
and $480 for above age 45.  The average monthly income from employment in 2002 is $3,158. (Statistical 
Highlights, 2003).  The average monthly household income is $5,262 (Department of Statistics, Household 
Expenditure Survey 1997/98) and the imputed average monthly household savings is $1,576.  
   7
Medisave holders may withdraw the savings at age 55, a minimum sum as set by the CPF 
Board has to be retained in the account for medical expenses during retirement.   In July 
2003, the Medisave minimum sum is decreed at $25,000.  Upon death, the remaining 
balance, which is exempted from estate duty, is paid in cash to the account holder's 
nominees. 
Similar to the CPF scheme, the medical savings account also maintains a one-to- 
one correspondence between contributions and benefits.  The ratio of Medisave 
withdrawals to contributions remains fairly steady at 15 to 100.  The average balance per 
account stands at $8,300 and about 87% of all hospital in-patients made use of Medisave 
to pay their hospital bills (Ministry of Health (MOH) Annual Report, 2001).  
Besides personal responsibility, the compulsory medical savings also incorporates 
features of family support.  This is in line with the official philosophy of promoting 
family responsibility in the area of healthcare financing. Although Medisave does not 
allow for risk pooling across individuals, it allows risk pooling among family members 
(including spouse, children, parents and grand-parents).  Indeed, Table 2 shows that 
children’s Medisave has been a major source of healthcare financing for the elderly.  
== Table 2 == 
A pitfall of Medisave is that it leads to income effects.  The demand for ward 
types especially for private unsubsidised ward and publicly provided subsidized wards 
tend to be relatively income elastic.  During the period of double digit economic growth 
from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, there was a shift in demand towards upgraded hospital   8
services particularly for better ward class.  About half of the private hospital bills were 
paid using Medisave.  Furthermore, in 1993, incomes from Medisave patients comprised 
about 50-60% of a private doctor’s total earnings (MOH, 1993).  Prior to the Asian 
financial crisis, during 1993-1996, the market share for private inpatient discharges 
increases, with patient load growing at 1% per annum while public patient discharge fell 
1.9% per annum.  However the pattern of growth changes after the 1997 financial crisis.  
During 1997-2002, private inpatient discharges fell 6.25% per annum, reversing the 1% 
per annum growth before the crisis.  As for the market share for public sector inpatient 
discharges, it grew at a positive rate of 0.5% per annum after the crisis.
8  
To minimize the efficiency loss from moral hazard, medical savings can only be 
used to pay for the relatively inelastic medical demands such as  hospitalization and 
surgery.  For out-patient services, Medisave is allowed for only a few relatively 
expensive treatments (e.g. vaccinations against hepatitis B, procedures for artificial 
insemination, renal dialysis, radiotherapy, chemotherapy and azimothymidine treatment).  
 
An important issue relating to the utilisation of Medisave is setting the limits on 
the amount that can be withdrawn.  If the Medisave Withdrawal Limit (MWL) is set too 
low, patients would have to make large out-of-pocket cash payments.  If it is too high, it 
may create incentives for patients to opt for the frills in higher-class wards at the expense 
of conserving Medisave for old age needs.  In the past, MWL depends on the patient’s 
length of hospital stay and the types of surgery performed.  However, with effect from 1st 
January 2004, the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) are implemented for MWL to cover 
                                                  
8 Data from Khoo (2003).   9
both inpatient and day surgery cases.  The MWLs now vary according to the patient's 
DRG assigned for the particular hospitalization episode.  The utilization of savings thus 
depends on the resources used and not on the length of stay.  More complex DRGs, 
which require more resources to treat, would have higher claimable limits.
9  The 
reimbursement is thus simplified with no separate reimbursements for room and board, 
intensive care unit, surgical operations and implants/approved medical consumables. 
10   
  
2.2  Medical insurance for catastrophic illnesses (Medishield) 
   To counter the inefficiency loss from the absence of risk pooling and the possible 
inadequacy of medical savings account, two different forms of insurance are provided.  
The first provision is in an implicit form, in terms of government subsidies for hospital 
care.  Except for higher class ward A which is unsubsidised, the other lower wards are.   
The level of subsidy varies according to ward types: 20% of cost for B1 ward, 50% for 
B2+ ward, 65% for B2 ward and 80% for C ward.  A comparison of the different ward 
classes is given in Appendix 1.  The second provision is an explicit low-cost national 
catastrophic illness insurance scheme (Medishield). Medishield was implemented in 1990 
but departed from the open-ended, unrestricted medical insurance as practiced in most 
developed countries.  For economies of scale and to minimize administrative costs, 
Medishield is administered by the CPF Board.  
                                                  
9 For patients who stay beyond the high-trimmed point (HTP) for the given DRG, additional 
reimbursements are given on a per diem basis.  The MOH sets the guidelines for MWL, HTP and outlier 
MWL for each DRG. 
  
10 It is estimated that with DRG MWL, fewer than 4% of the subsidized patients in B2 class ward (which 
are entitled to 50% subsidies) in restructured hospitals need to pay out of pocket.  Before the introduction 
of DRG MWL, almost 20% of the B2 class patients had to pay out of pocket.  Furthermore, there are 
proposals to raise the claim limits for Medishield scheme so that patients may claim more for treatment and 
pay less out of pocket.  (The Straits Times, March 19, 2003 and Parliamentary Debates, 2003)   10
In the implementation of Medishield, there are built-in guidelines to prevent over-
provision of and excessive demand for medical. To prevent an over-provision of medical 
services arising from third party payments, Medishield operates on a system of 
negotiated fee schedules to restrict the amount providers may charge the insurers.   
Control is exercised through limits on the liability per individual and type of illnesses.  
To curb excessive demand for medical services, there are limits to claims per 
individual per policy year and per lifetime.  Medishield reimbursements are based on a 
system of co-payments and deductibles.  Deductibles are set high because it is designed 
to cover catastrophic illnesses.  High deductibles are also necessary to keep premiums 
low and affordable.
11  However, there are no deductibles for out-patient chemotherapy, 
radiotherapy and kidney dialysis treatment.  Medishield premiums can be paid from the 
medical savings account.  The premiums vary across different age groups to minimize 
cross subsidy.  Since inception in 1985, the annual premiums have been kept low and 
have remained at a range from $12 for those below age 30 and $390 for those between 
the age of 79 and 80 years old; and there is no Medishield coverage after age 80.  As of 
December 1999, MediShield and an enhanced scheme MediShield Plus,
12 has 
                                                  
11 MediShield starts paying when the total claimable medical expenses exceed the deductibles. The 
deductibles are varies from S$500 a year for patients in a ward with 7 or more beds (C ward) to $1,000 a 
year for patients in other ward classes.  MediShield pays 80% of the amount in excess of the deductibles 
and the insured pays the remaining 20% co-insurance. There is also maximum amount claimable which is 
set at $30,000 for a policy year and $120,000 for a lifetime. These amounts are based on the average 
charges incurred by patients in a 6-bedded ward (B2 ward) in a public hospital. 
 
12 Medishield Plus is an enhanced Medishield Scheme.  It caters for those who want to be admitted to 
higher-class wards in either a public or a private hospital.  There are two plans under Medishield Plus.  Plan 
A reimburses up to $623 per day of hospitalization (with a deductible of $4000) and Plan B which pays up 
to $375 per day (with a deductible of $2500).  The premium for Plan A and Plan B are 5 and 3 times of the 
basic Medishield premium respectively.   Medishield has been operating at a deficit for several years.  In 
2003, it collected $54 million in premiums but paid out $65.3 million in claims.  The issue of raising the 
premium rate is under debate.  However, the higher value-added Medishield Plus scheme is in a healthier 
shape. The 2003 Ministry of Health Annual Report indicates that Medishield Plus collected more than $44   11
membership of 2.02 million (Ministry of Health Annual Report, 2001).   Medisave 
account holders who are Singapore citizens or permanent residents below the age of 75 
are covered under Medishield, as long as they have not opted out of the scheme.  An on-
going debate is whether to make Medishield compulsory, to increase deductibles and to 
provide better coverage by increasing the premiums.  However these issues are not the 
focus of this paper.
13 
2.3  Medical expense assistance (Medifund) 
While Medisave and Medishield are designed to ensure efficiency, Medifund is 
designed with equity consideration.  As a safety net, Medifund helps to meet the medical 
needs of the poor and indigent.  Medifund was established in April 1993 as an 
endowment fund with an initial capital of $200 million.  Capital is injected into the fund 
as and when there are overall government budget surpluses.  The capital sum currently 
stands at $900 million, representing about 0.6% of GDP.   To ensure sustainability, only 
the interest income from the capital sum are used.  Furthermore, there are strict 
guidelines on the eligibility to qualify for Medifund support.  With means-tested 
procedures, Medifund serves as a help of last resort for patients who are unable to pay for 
their medical expenses despite Medishield and Medisave.  Only Singaporean patients 
receiving in-patient treatment in the subsidized lower class wards of B2- and C- Class or 
out-patient treatment in public hospitals are eligible for financial assistance from 
Medifund.   
                                                                                                                                                
million in premiums but paid out a relatively modest $14 million in claims during the year.  Medishield 
Plus has a smaller policy base of 0.348 million compared to 1.32 million of Medishield.    
13 As of March 2003, 200,000 people (most of them elderly) are not covered by Medishield or any other 
private medical insurance scheme.  (Parliamentary Debates, March 2003)    12
 
3.   Present value of healthcare expenditure  
Under the current financing framework, patients in the public sector restructured 
hospitals are subsidised according to the ward class of their choice.  It is the patients’ 
responsibility to ensure that they choose a ward class that is affordable and they are 
expected to pay the unsubsidised portion of the medical costs.  For non-catastrophic 
illness, the unsubsidised portion is paid out from Medisave (subject to its withdrawal 
rules) and then from out-of-pocket.  For catastrophic illnesses, Medishield reimbursement 
is available for expenditures that exceed the “deductible” as described in Section 2.2.  
However, Medishield pays only 80% of the excess up to a pre-set claimable limits 
14 
Amounts not reimbursable by Medishield would have to be paid out of Medisave, other 
health insurance plans or out-of-pocket.
15  In cases when the combination of funds fails to 
cover the medical costs, individuals could seek financial help from Medifund.  The fact 
that Medifund is funded by government budgetary surpluses underlines the government’s 
stand that national health must be attained within the limits of existing resources. 
Besides, by allowing regular contributors to Medisave and Medishield preferential access 
to Medifund underscores the importance of individual responsibility to finance health 
care expenses.   
 
Previous studies on the medical savings accounts in Singapore have mainly 
focused on whether it has helped to contain medical cost growth (see Barr 2001, Hsiao 
                                                  
14 In practice, Medishield pays only 40% of the total hospital bill. (Straits Times, 17 August 2004). 
15 Currently 4 in 10 patients in subsidised B2 class wards have medical bills that exceed what they can 
claim from Medishield. (The Straits Times, March 19 2003) An on-going policy issue is to raise claim 
limits which imply a hike in premiums. (Parliamentary Debates, 2003)   
   13
1995 and Shortt 2002).  We depart from this issue and ask how much the medical savings 
accounts would be needed for the representative Singaporean male and female elderly to 
adequately meet the post-retirement healthcare costs. Indeed, the government has 
instituted a minimum sum scheme in the medical savings account to ensure that account 
holders have enough funds to meet the medical expenses during the post-retirement. The 
minimum sum, which is revised regularly to reflect the increased medical costs, is set at 
$25,000 for year 2003.  In our analysis, we do not take this government-decreed 
minimum sum as given.  Instead we estimate the minimum sum that would support the 
stream of future healthcare expenditures for the elderly at retirement.    
 
Assuming a maximum lifespan of 105 years and that retirement starts at age 62, 
the estimated present value of healthcare expenses (PVHE) of the representative 








=        ( 1 )  
where  
j c  = calibrated healthcare expenditure for month j 
j v   = discount factor at time j 
62 P j  = probability of survival of the elderly starting at age 62 up to time (62 + j).
16 
                                                  
16 In our calibration of  j c  and 62 P j , we distinguish elderly cohorts by gender.  But for ease of notation, 
we do not append the gender subscripts to the terms in equation (1). 
   14
 
3.1  Calibration of healthcare expenditure  
The key determinants of healthcare expenses of the elderly depend on the 
demographic and health sector related factors. Unfortunately, there is no published 
disaggregated data on the medical expenditure of the elderly by gender and by age.  In 
order to reasonably estimate the medical care expenditure, we make use of an 
unpublished longitudinal study by Chan (2001) on the transition in health, wealth and 
welfare of the elderly Singaporeans.
17  The panel survey provides detailed breakdowns of 
medical expenditure by gender, by age and by socio-economic status identified by 
different dwelling types.  About 85% of Singapore’s population resides in public housing, 
which differ by the number of rooms.  In Singapore, housing types reflect the relative 
economic status among households and in many public policies housing types have been 
used as a targeting guide.  Table 3 presents the average size of housing types and the 
average and mean income for the different public and private housing dwellers.  About 
half of the elderly in the survey live in the smaller 1-room, 2-room or 3-room public 
housing.  The remaining 43% are in bigger 4- and 5- room public housing; and with only 
6% in private housing.  The extracted survey data on health expenditures and the 
corresponding sample sizes by age group and sex are presented in Tables 4 and 5, 
respectively.   
 
== Tables 3, 4, 5 == 
                                                  
17 The longitudinal survey was jointly conducted by the Ministry of Community Development and the 
National University of Singapore.  The survey was conducted in two phases.  The first was carried out in 
1995 with 4750 individuals aged 55 and above.  The follow-up study was conducted in 1999 with about 
42% of the original sample data.     15
 
We want to point out that the average medical expenditure for the elderly is 
consistent with the published data on the average hospital inpatient bill size for the three 
hospitals with geriatric departments in Singapore.
18  Since most of the elderly in the 
sample under study do not have private health insurance, it is expected that the average 
inpatient bill for the subsidized ward are reasonably close to the out-of-pocket 
expenditure.  This is further supported by Koh (1998) that the age profile of the insured 
exhibited a downward trend for the older age group.  Those aged 55 and above 
constituted about 5% of the insured base, while those age 60 and above accounted for 
only 2%. 
 
Essentially the calibration of future healthcare expenditure involves three steps.  
First, we assume that the maximum lifespan of individuals in Singapore is 105 years so 
that the elderly aged 62 in year 2003 will be at age (62 + x) in year (2003 + x), for x = 1, 
2, 3, …, 44, respectively.  The nominal annual healthcare expenditure for the female and 
male elderly aged (62 + x) in year (2003 + x) can be calibrated by multiplying the base 
expenditure corresponding to the elderly by gender and dwelling type at age (62 + x) in 
the survey data reported in Tables 4 and 5 by a cumulative factor assuming at a constant 
annual growth rate for x years.   Second, we pick a flat rate of 4% as the benchmark for 
the annual growth rate of healthcare expenses.  This is because over the period from 1990 
to 2001, the published average nominal annual growth rate of medical care in Singapore 
                                                  
18 Singapore Ministry of Health website at http://www.moh.gov.sg/corp/charges/common/procedures.doc 
        16
is about 3.8%.
19   Next, we convert the calibrated medical expenses at age (62 + x) into 
monthly expenses by taking the monthly average of the calibrated figure within year 
(2003 + x).  Finally, the present value
20 of healthcare expenditure (PVHE) of the elderly 
by sex at age 62 is obtained by discounting the stream of calibrated monthly healthcare 
expenses, weighted by the survival probability of the elderly over the entire post-
retirement period.  The choice of discount rates and computation of the survival 
probability of the elderly by sex and by age will be discussed in Sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3, 
respectively.     
 
In order to conduct sensitivity analysis of the PVHE, we also set the annual 
growth rates of medical expenditure in Singapore to 3% and 5%, respectively.  These 
growth rates are chosen to mimic the ageing experiences of Japan and the OECD 
countries.  For example, Nakanishi and Nakayama (2001) reported that the medical 
expenditure in Japan grew at an annual rate of 5.5% from 1980 to 1994.  Mayhew (2000), 
based on the past 30 years experiences of the OECD countries, extrapolated the 
underlying rate of medical expenditure growth to about 4%.  The streams of future 
monthly healthcare expenditures at these alternative growth rates were then calibrated 
accordingly as in the benchmark case.  
 
                                                  
19 See Chia (2002).  One referee perceptively points out that the Singaporean government does not follow 
the OECD method of compiling its national health expenditures as expenditures on traditional medicine are 
excluded. Hence, the total health expenditure figures may be understated.  We acknowledge this deficiency.   
However, we do not have access to data on the size of this sector.  Moreover, the growth rates of medical 
expenses among different age groups of the elderly could be different.  Again, owing to non-availability of 
data, we assume a constant growth rate. 
 
20 PVHE is computed in terms of dollars in year 1999.  To facilitate comparison with the decreed minimum 
savings in MSA for year 2003, we further convert the PVHE into the dollars in year 2003.  Details are 
given in footnote 25.   17
 
3.2   Discount rates 
The calibrated stream of future healthcare expenses are to be discounted by the 
appropriate yield curves.  We employ two alternatives to model the structure of interest 
rates: a stochastic model and two deterministic models.  As there are no consensus choice 
for modelling stochastic interest rates
21, we follow Tse (1995), Lachance et al. (2003), 
and Chia and Tsui (2003) to generate stochastic interest rates using the following 
discretized version of the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) (CIR) short-term rates model:
 22 
   rt +1   =  rt + θ ( ra - rt )  +  β rt
½ ε t+1                  (2) 
 
where rt is the short-rate at time t.  The second term on the right-hand side of (2) captures 
the deterministic trend which consists of the long-term average interest rate, ra , and the 
speed of mean-reversion, θ, respectively.  For θ > 0, rt is expected to decrease and revert 
to ra if the current rate is above the long-run mean, and vice versa.  The third term 
captures the stochastic part, consisting of independently and identically distributed 
standard normal random variable εt +1; and β is the volatility parameter. 
 
   The deterministic interest rate models used to discount the future cash flows are 
the constant yield curve (CYC) model and the fixed yield curve (FYC) model. The CYC 
model sticks to a flat annual rate to discount all future cash flows.  Choices include 2%, 
3%, 4% and 5%, respectively.  In particular, the 4% flat rate can be regarded as the 
                                                  
21 See “Term-Structure Models” in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 11). 
22 Tse (1995) is the only available empirical study on the stochastic behaviour of 3-month Treasury-bill 
rates in Singapore.  He finds that the CIR model provides reasonable replicates of the yield curves.  
Lachance et al. (2003) also use the CIR approach to model yield curves in simulation exercises on option-
embedded defined contribution pensions.    18
average of nominal rates historically paid on the Medisave accounts.
23  The FYC model 
is constructed using the average of the available historical rates for the government bonds 
issued in Singapore since 1988.  They comprise 2.3% for 3-month bills, 2.5% for 1-year 
bills, 3.0% for 2-year bonds, 3.9% for 5-year bonds, 3.8% for 7-year bonds, 4.3% for 10-
year bonds and 3.9% for the 15-year bonds, respectively.  We use the 15-year rate as 
proxy for spot rates with longer durations.  Spot rates for other durations below 15 years 
are obtained by the method of interpolation.   
 
3.3   Survival probabilities 
Appropriate life tables are required to calculate the present value of the estimated 
healthcare expenses of the elderly.  Based on the available 22 abridged life tables from 
1980 to 2001, we follow the procedure in Chia and Tsui (2003) to construct the complete 
cohort life tables. 
 
Basically the construction takes three main steps.  First, we predict the future 
mortality rates of the elderly using the published abridged life tables for Singapore from 
1980 to 1999.  The following Lee-Carter (LC) model (1992, 2000) is used to fit mortality 
rates for the male and female elderly of age 62 to 85 and above:  
ln mx t
 = ax  + bx kt + εxt     (3) 
kt =  µ +  φ kt-1 + ηt      ( 4 )  
where mx t
 is the central death rate in age class x in year t; ax is the additive age-specific 
constant, reflecting the general shape of the age schedule; bx
 is the responsiveness of 
                                                  
23 We are grateful to two referees for pointing out such an interpretation.  The average annual rate is 4% for 
the period from 10/2001 to 9/2004.  See data on interest rates at: http://www.cpf.gov.sg/cpf_info/In.    19
mortality at age class x to variations in the general level; kt is a time-specific index of the 
general level of mortality; µ and  φ  are parameters; εxt is the error to the actual age 
schedule, assuming to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and a constant 
variance; and ηt is the white noise.  Lee and Carter examine the long-term patterns of the 
natural logarithm of central death rates with the single time-specific index of mortality kt. 
A lower order autoregressive process is included to absorb the dynamic relationship of kt 
between time (t – 1) and t.  The Lee-Carter model has been successfully applied to the G7 
countries to forecast life expectancy at birth.  See Tuljapurkar et al. (2000).   
 
Second, based on the predicted mortality rates obtained from the preceding step, 
the abridged cohort life tables are calibrated using techniques developed by Bourbeau et 
al. (1997).  Third, the calibrated abridged cohort mortality rates are converted into annual 
mortality rates using Pollard (1989)’s methodology.  These annual mortality rates are 
then converted to monthly rates.  Finally the monthly mortality rates are converted to 
monthly survival rates accordingly. 
 
4.  Results and discussions 
We perform Monte Carlo experiments to estimate the present value of healthcare 
expenses (PVHE) for both male and female elderly at age 62 under the CIR model.   
Different values of PVHE are simulated with 10,000 replications using equations (1) and 
(2) under various combinations of interest rate paths, growth rates of healthcare expenses, 
and cohort survival probabilities by sex.  All computations and estimations are coded in 
Gauss.  We first simulate the PVHE based on the set of benchmark parameters.   As   20
displayed in Table 6,  the calibrated parameters for the benchmark scenario include: the 
4% medical growth rate; the long-term average rate at 4%, the initial rate at 2%, 3% and 
4%; the mean reversion parameter θ at 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4; and the interest rate volatility   
parameter β at 0.01, 0.02 and 0.03 respectively.
24   For each combination of θ and β, the 
short-rates are aggregated to obtain the yield curve, which is used to discount the 
corresponding lifetime healthcare expenses.  We repeat the procedure to obtain different 
PVHE corresponding to each of the nine different combinations of (θ, β) along with each 
of the initial rates.  Finally, the reported PVHE is the average value of all the simulated 
PVHE from the 27 different combinations of the initial interest rates and (θ, β). 
 
Besides the benchmark parameters, we conduct sensitivity analysis using: [a] 
different growth rates of medical expenses at 3% and 5%; [b] different long-term average 
rates at 2%, 3% and 5% under the CIR model; [c] the constant yield curve (CYC) model 
with flat interest rates at 2%, 3%, 4% and 5% for all durations; and [d] the fixed yield 
curve (FYC) model based on the average of historical spot rates for different durations, 
respectively.
 25  Tables 7 and 8 report different values of the estimated PVHE using 
alternative parameterisation of medical expenditure growth rates, long term interest rates 
(ra) and the deterministic rates.  
 
== Tables 6, 7, 8 === 
 
                                                  
24 These calibrated values are based on the estimation results of the CIR model using the historical 3-month 
Treasury bill rates in Singapore.    
25 As mentioned in footnote 20, all reported PVHE in Tables 7 and 8 are in terms of dollars in year 2003.  
To facilitate a meaningful comparison with the decreed minimum sum in year 2003, they are adjusted for 
price inflations from year 1999 to year 2003, which are 1.3%, 1%, -0.4% and 0.5%, respectively.   21
As can be observed from Tables 7 and 8, the estimated PVHE are reasonably 
robust to the different interest rate models.  In particular, the PVHE for both the male and 
female elderly under the CIR and CYC models are all consistently close to each other in 
most of the scenarios. For example, under the benchmark (i.e., 4% medical growth rate 
and 4% mean interest rate), PVHE for the female elderly in 3-room are $24,557 and 
$24,676 under the CIR and CYC models, respectively; as compared to the corresponding 
$24,110 and $24,198 for the male elderly (see Table 7, panel [b]). Similar pattern is 
observed for those more well-to-do elderly living in the 5-room housing.  However, 
discrepancies of PVHE between the female and male elderly become more alarming.  For 
example, at the benchmark scenario, the estimated PVHE for the female elderly in 5-
room are $38,245 and $38,523 under the CIR and CYC models; as compared to the 
corresponding $24,614 and $24,727 for the male elderly. See Table 8, panel [b] for 
details.   
 
The adequacy of MSA may be assessed by comparing the simulated values of 
PVHE with the decreed minimum sum.  As can be gleaned from panel [b] in Tables 7 and 
8, the decreed amount of $25,000 in the medical savings accounts would be adequate for 
both the female and male elderly in the smaller 3-room and for the male elderly in the 
bigger 5-room at 4% medical expense growth rate and at higher discount rates of 4% or 
above.   For the female elderly in 5-room, the decreed sum would be inadequate to meet 
the healthcare requirement at the different growth rates of medical expenses, even when 
higher discount rates such as 5%.  For example, at the benchmark long-term interest rate   22
of average rate of 4%, the shortfall from the decreed sum increases from 34% to 54% and 
then to 75% as medical growth increases from 3% to 4% and then to 5%. 
   
Turning to the elasticity of PVHE with respect to the growth rate of medical 
expenses and to the mean interest rates, we find relative uniformity in the magnitude for 
both the male and female elderly under the CIR and CYC models.
26  For example, a 1% 
increase in medical expenditure under the benchmark scenario leads to a 0.74% increase 
in PVHE for the female elderly in 3-room and 0.60% in 5-room.  The corresponding 
increase for the male elderly in 3-room and 5-room housing are 0.61% and 0.58% 
respectively.  A 1% increase in the long-term interest rate under the benchmark scenario 
leads to a 0.70% decrease in PVHE for the female elderly in 3-room and 0.50% in 5-
room; and a corresponding 0.61% decrease for the male elderly in 3-room and 0.50% in 
5-room.  Hence, for both gender the PVHE is slightly more elastic to growth rates of 
healthcare expenses than to long-term interest rates charged to MSA. 
 
Next, we shall explore the policy implications arising from a positive relationship 
between PVHE and medical growth rate, and a negative relationship between PVHE and 
the interest rate earned on MSA. Given the decreed minimum sum set at $25,000, it is 
interesting to know how policy makers would respond to a 1% increase in the medical 
growth rate.  There are two options available: either raising the minimum sum amount 
without increasing the interest rate earned on MSA or increasing the interest rate earned 
on  the MSA without raising the decreed minimum sum.    
                                                  
26 It can be easily shown that the PVHE increases with an increase in the medical cost growth rate and 
decreases with an increase in the interest rate charged to MSA.  The latter is due to the time value of 
money.   23
 
In what follows, we consider the impact of increasing the interest rate earned on 
MSA without raising the decreed minimum sum.  If θi is defined as the percentage 
change in the interest rate charged to MSA and θg is the percentage change in healthcare 
growth rate, then the following relationship holds for a given level of PVHE, 
  
θi   = (ηh, g /ηh, i) x θg                                                       (5) 
 
where  ηh, g  is the elasticity of PVHE  with respect to the growth rate of healthcare 
expenses and  ηh i  is the elasticity of PVHE with respect to interest rate charged to MSA. 
Values of θi could be computed from our simulated PVHE.  For illustrative purposes, the 
estimated values of θi under the benchmark scenario for the female and male elderly in 3-
room are 1.06 and 1.0, respectively.  This implies from equation (5) that for those elderly 
in 3-room, with a 1% increase in medical growth rate, the interest rate earned on MSA for 
the female and male elderly should be increased by 1.06% and 1.0%, respectively.   
Similarly, the estimated values of θi for the female and male elderly in 5-room are 1.20 
and 1.16, respectively.  This indicates that for a 1% increase in the medical growth rate, 
the interest rate earned on MSA for the female and male elderly should be increased by 
1.20% and 1.16%, respectively.   Such values of θi may serve as useful guides to raise the 
interest rate charged on the MSA in order to ensure adequate savings to finance post-
retirement medical expenses without raising the decreed minimum sum.  This policy 
option seems to be vital when the balance in the MSA is alarmingly below the decreed 
minimum sum.  As shown in Table 9, the average Medisave balance stands at only   24
$13,769 as at 31 December 2000.  Hence, it may provide support for the case of raising 
the interest rate charged on the MSA.  
 
== Insert Table 9 === 
 
5.
    Concluding remarks 
We have assessed the adequacy of using MSA to finance healthcare expenditure 
for the representative Singaporean male and female over their post-retirement period.  
We estimate the present value of lifetime healthcare expenses of the elderly upon 
retirement at age 62 by gender and by income types which are stratified according to the 
dwelling types.  Our approach involves calibrating the healthcare expenses of the elderly, 
constructing cohort mortality rates from abridged life tables and employing three 
different interest rate models to discount the future cash flows.  The estimated healthcare 
expenses under different scenarios are then compared with the government decreed 
minimum sum in the medical savings accounts.   
 
Our simulation results show that under the benchmark scenario, the decreed 
minimum balance of $25,000 in the individual Medisave account would be adequate for 
both the less well-off male and female elderly in the 3-room public housing at 4% 
medical cost growth and at 4% or higher discount rates.  It is also adequate for the better-
off male elderly in the bigger 4 and 5-room flats, but not so for the female elderly.  The 
inadequacy for the female elderly is in the range of 34% to 75% of the decreed sum of 
$25,000 and it becomes more severe when medical expense grows at higher rates.     25
 
Our findings are consistent with the fact that Medisave has contributed to the 
framework of a cultural rhetoric of personal responsibility for health care (see Barr 2001).  
Indeed, Pauly and Goodman (1995b), Massaro and Wong (1995), Eiff et al. (2002), 
Gratzer (2002) and others have commended on Singapore for attaining developed 
country’s health indicators (life expectancy, infant mortality, etc.) at a fraction of the cost 
operating in most developed countries.
27 Aside from economic efficiency, patients have 
easy access to technology as bypass surgery and organ transplants, with minimal waiting 
time.  And the income of physicians in Singapore is about the same in relation to average 
wages as physician income in Germany or the United States.   
             
In order to keep the current decreed amount remain relatively unchanged at the 
decreed level of $25,000, our study suggests that for 1% increase in the growth rate of 
medical expenses, the interest rate earned on MSA ought to be increased to 1.06% and 
1.0% respectively for the female and male elderly in 3-room flats; and to 1.20% and 
1.16% for those in 4- and 5-room flats, respectively.  However, the reality may be less 
rosy.  According to the Ministry of Health in Singapore, only 56% of Singaporeans who 
reached age 55 in 2000 year have Medisave savings that were at least the Medisave 
minimum sum (which was decreed at $19,000).  Table 9 shows that the average of 
Medisave balances of these Singaporeans were about $13,769.  It also indicates that for 
those aged 60 to 64 in 2000, the average balance is 32% short of the decreed amount.  It 
increases as we move up the age group.  For example, the shortfall for those aged 60 to 
                                                  
27 Singapore’s healthcare costs are around 3% of GDP, compared to 9.3% for Canada and 10.5% for 
Germany.  However, there is a perception that great care must be exercised in attributing Singapore’s low 
expenditure on health care to the MSA program. (Barr, 2001; Pauly, 2001)    26
64 is 53% and that for 70+ is 77%.  Hence the impact of using MSA as a healthcare 
financing scheme should be evaluated within the entire health care financing framework.   
 
  The image of a three-legged stool has often been used to represent support in 
retirement (Cutler 1996).  A similar three-legged stool may be used to represent the 
alternative means of healthcare financing.  They include a compulsory individual medical 
savings, a high-deductible medical insurance for catastrophic illnesses, and government 
insurance and assistance.  In order to strengthen the leg of medical savings account, the 
Singapore government has introduced a series of Medisave top-ups for the elderly since 
1995. The amount of top-ups increases with the age of the elderly.  In 2001, to help 
Singaporeans build up their savings faster, the government pegged the interest rate of 
Medisave account to that of the special account.  It was estimated by the government that 
a typical Medisave Account holder between age 40 and 55 would earn about an 
additional of $8,100 as interest income if the Medisave interest rate is increased by 1.5% 
per annum. However, there is a limit to increasing the amount in the medical savings 
accounts.  The balance in the account depends on the economic health, particularly on 
full employment which enables Singaporeans to make sufficient contributions to the CPF.  
This warrants re-looking at alternatives that would help to strengthen the leg of medical 
savings account or even the other legs.
28  For instance, the government could lengthen the 
leg of medical insurance by raising the claim limits for Medishield.  The Singapore 
government has also attempted to strengthen the disability care insurance by introducing 
                                                  
28 Chia and Lim (2003) use a computable general equilibrium model to assess the various mechanisms to 
strengthen the medical savings account in the event of medical inflation.  The mechanisms considered 
include tops up in medical saving account and increasing interest on Medisave account.   
   27
Eldershield in September 2002.  This insurance scheme was designed to help people who 
become severely disabled.
29  In order to further ensure affordability of medical cares, the 
MOH has recently made available more class C beds (open wards with minimum frills 
and 80% government subsidies) to lower income Singaporeans.
30   
 
This paper has confined its analysis to assessing the adequacy of the decreed 
amount in MSA for the Singaporean elderly to finance healthcare expenses in their post-
retirement.  However, a more comprehensive evaluation should be conducted within the 
whole financing structure in the accumulation process of the forced savings in MSA, 
together with periodic fine tunings to ensure smooth functioning of the system.  In 
addition, wider coverage of longitudinal surveys should be conducted to trace 
relationships between health spending and the demographic and health sector-related 









                                                  
29 Eldershield was touted as one of the key components of 3M plus 2E healthcare financing formula (2Es 
include the Eldershield and Eldercare).  But responses to these schemes have been disappointing. 
30 In September 2001, the Singapore General Hospital increased the number of Class C beds by 74% and 
the National University Hospital increased the number by 170%.    28
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Table 1: Contributions to the Central Provident Fund, January 2002 
 









(% of wage) 
Total 
Contribution 










35 & below  16  20  36  26  4  6 
Above 35 – 45 
Above 45 –55 
Above 55 – 60 

























Source: Singapore CPF website: http://www.gov.sg/cpf 
 
 
Table 2: Provision of health care financing for the aged by gender  
(in percentage) 
 
Type of Provision  Total  Men  Female 
Children’s  Medisave 55.0 43.8  65.0 
Spouse’s Medisave  2.0  0.6  3.2 
Own Medisave  17.9  30.1  6.9 
Own savings  12.0  13.1  11.1 
Other provisions  5.2  5.1  5.3 
No provision  7.9  7.3  8.5 





Table 3: Profile of households by housing types in Singapore 
  Public Housing    












Average Floor  




























































Source: Singapore, Housing Development Board (2000), Household Expenditure Survey 
1997/98 and HDB website.  
Note: 1 sq. m.  = 10.764 sq. ft.   33
                
                        Table 4:  Annual medical expenditure of elderly 
in 1-, 2- and 3-room public housing  
 








$601      (78) 
$813      (78) 
$1392    (48) 
$1592    (36) 
$1789    (76) 
$836      (39) 
$954      (12) 
$730     (83) 
$601     (74) 
$716     (98) 
$1440   (83) 
$903     (111) 
$911      (47) 
$1903    (16) 
 
Source: Transition in Health, Wealth and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995-1999, 
unpublished survey data.    
Note:    The figures in parenthesis indicate the sample size.  The data is made available by A. Chan 
(2001), Department of Sociology at the National University of Singapore, who coordinated with 
the Ministry of Community Development to conduct a longitudinal study of the transition in 
health, wealth and welfare of the elderly Singaporeans.  The first panel survey is conducted in 
1995 with 4750 individuals aged 55 and above.  The follow-up survey conducted in 1999 includes 






                 Table 5:  Annual medical expenditure of elderly 
                                  in 4- and 5-room public housing  
  








$883      (80) 
$714      (75) 
$1824    (39) 
$1130    (29) 
$1263    (73) 
$1108    (28) 
$1505     (5) 
$1925      (81) 
$1537      (87) 
$1159      (84) 
$1327      (58) 
$1458      (79) 
$1410      (41) 
$1750      (16) 
 
Source: Transition in Health, Wealth and Welfare of Elderly Singaporeans: 1995-1999, 
unpublished survey data by Chan (2001). 
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 Table 6: Values of parameters for different scenarios 
_______________________________________________________________ 
(i)  Healthcare expenses 
             Growth rate of medical expenditure (mg) = 4 % per annum.  Other values            
             are 3% and 5%. 
 
(ii)  Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model of stochastic interest rates: 
   Initial interest rate = 2%, 3%, and 4% 
      Average interest rate (ra) = 2%, 3%, 4% and 5%  
             Values of mean reversion (θ) = 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 
             Value of the interest rate volatility parameter (β) = 0.01, 0.02 and 0.03 
_________________________________________________________________ 
   35
Table 7:   
Comparison of PVHE for the elderly in 3-room under different interest rate models 
 
Scenario Model  Female  Male 
[a] 3% medical growth rate 
 r a = 2% 
 
 
 r a = 3% 
 
 
      ra = 4% 
  
  
      ra = 5% 
 
 
[b] 4% medical growth rate 
      ra = 2%  
     
 
      ra = 3%  
     
 
      ra = 4% 
    
 
      ra = 5%  
       
  
 
[c] 5% medical growth rate 
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      ra = 4% 
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CYC 
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CYC 
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      $24170 




























PVHE  for the female and male elderly are computed using three different interest rate models.  CIR 
represents the yield curve generated by the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross model with 10,000 replications; CYC is 
the flat yield curve at 2%, 3%, 4% and 5% respectively; and FYC is the fixed yield curve based on the 
mean spot rates of government bonds with various durations.     36
Table 8:   
Comparison of PVHE for the elderly in 5-room under different interest rate models 
 
Scenario Model  Female  Male 
[a] 3% medical growth rate 
 r a = 2% 
 
 
 r a = 3% 
 
 
      ra = 4% 
  
  
      ra = 5% 
 
 
[b] 4% medical growth rate 
      ra = 2%  
     
 
      ra = 3%  
     
 
      ra = 4% 
    
 
      ra = 5%  
       
  
 
[c] 5% medical growth rate 
       ra = 2% 
     
 
       ra = 3% 
   
 
      ra = 4% 
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CYC 
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      $24667 




























PVHE  for the female and male elderly are computed using three different interest rate models.  CIR 
represents the yield curve generated by the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross model with 10,000 replications; CYC is 
the flat yield curve at 2%, 3%, 4% and 5% respectively; and FYC is the fixed yield curve based on the 
mean spot rates of government bonds with various durations.    37
Table 9: 
Number of Medisave Accounts and Balance by Age as at 31 December 2000 
 
 
Active members  Inactive members 
Age group 
No. of accounts  Average balance No. of accounts Average balance 
Total 
 Members 
Below 25  94,256  $ 2,901  61,359  $ 615  155,615 
25 - 34  387,832  $ 10,497  140,032  $ 4,689  527,864 
35 - 44  372,290  $ 16,996  243,722  $ 7,074  616,012 
45 - 54  249,079  $ 17,812  224,068  $ 6,528  473,147 
55 - 59  54,454  $ 15,942  92,040  $ 5,186  146,494 
60 - 64  21,771  $ 14,374  65,039  $ 4,872  86,810 
65 - 69  14,012  $ 12,461  74,338  $ 4,018  88,350 
70 +  9,053  $ 10,689  152,486  $ 2,280  161,539 
Total  1,202,747  $ 13,769  1,053,084  $ 5,053  2,255,831 
Source: Singapore, Ministry of Health Press Release: Stretching your Medisave Dollar. August 2001.   
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Appendix 1: Comparison of classes of hospital wards in Singapore 
Differences  Ward 







No. of beds  per 
room 
Subsidy rate 
A  Y Y Y Y  1-2  0% 
B1  Y Y Y Y  4  20% 
B2+  Y Y N N  5  50% 
B2  N N N N  6  65% 
C  N N N N  >  6*  80% 
Notes: *means more than 6 beds in the open ward. Y stands for “available” and N stands for “not 
available”. 
Source: Ministry of Health website 
 